Nick Harvey MP

OVERSTRETCH IN THE ARMED FORCES

Defence has hit a critical juncture: our forces are overstretched, undermanned and in vital need of resources with little idea of how long we will maintain our current commitments. It is time to be asking, as a nation, where do we go from here?

Iraq has dragged on far longer than was ever expected, and with our forces now largely confined to Basra airbase we are having a minimal impact on the ongoing campaign. Whilst I maintain that we should now be undertaking a phased withdrawal from Iraq, once training is complete, we need to reenergise our approach to Afghanistan. I was recently in Afghanistan and it was clear to me that it is going to require sustained efforts from all allies over the long term to meet the objectives and ensure stability and security for a region that has been beset by conflict for decades. There is little doubt that this is the war of our generation and one to which we need now to turn our attentions to ensure that the progress we have made thus far is not undone by a lack of focus. It has already been impeded by a diversion of resources to Iraq; it is time now to return to our original mission.

However, if we are to do this successfully and ensure a legacy for the future we have to address a number of issues. Firstly, the welfare of our service personnel is critical to our operational success. At present we are at risk of exhausting the physical and psychological well-being of our forces, to the detriment of future operations. Indeed, there are few incentives to join a force with long tours, frequent operations, lengthy periods away from home, and limited compensations given in return.

The quality of service accommodation still falls far short of adequate; families are still disadvantaged by the naturally mobile lifestyle in the forces; medical and mental health care could be improved and with small recompense for injuries gained in service it would not be hard to assert that we are failing our forces. Indeed, a recent report pointed to a trend of mental trauma following conflict leading to nearly one tenth of Britain's prison population being personnel or former personnel. That is just one clue among many, but it is a clear sign that we are not providing the 'through-service' care that is needed for what is a unique and challenging job.

The Government's White Paper, 'The Nation's Commitment', is an attempt to be seen to be addressing these problems, but as is so often the case we have to make sure good ideas are backed up by positive action, and constructive assistance. It could not come soon enough and it is surprising that such a report has only been issued now, over seven years into the current major operations.

Certainly, we have more lessons to learn from these conflicts. Britain's Armed Forces have been suffering from a plethora of problems after having been failed by successive Governments. An outdated approach to defence, coupled with a lack of constructive investment and a culture of over-optimistic procurement deadlines have taken their toll on our wider approach to defence.

We have naval vessels designed for the 1970s, whilst our frontline forces in Afghanistan are using Snatch Land Rovers unsuitable for the desert terrain. We are paying millions in unwieldy and expensive procurements when basic kit fails to make the grade. And we have Nimrods unfit to fly while helicopters are left sitting unused in hangars. Whilst trying to meet long term strategic objectives we have often failed to provide for the short term.

Yet, at the same time, we need to rethink our long term goals to bring our defence strategy into the twenty-first century, moving beyond Cold War planning assumptions to ensure a flexible, versatile and easily deployable force that can be tailored as needed to suit conflict, humanitarian or peace keeping missions. Prime Ministers Tony Blair and Gordon Brown have so often spoken of being a force for good in the world and yet we have not yet reconciled ourselves to the fact that we have been operating with a quasi-superpower mentality but a small country's budget. We cannot compete with America in terms of our investment in defence, and we shouldn't try.

Instead, we should look to maximise our capabilities by cooperation with our allies on both sides of the Atlantic and through organisations like NATO. This does not have to mean undermining our own industries and skill bases, which are already suffering from a shortage of intellectual capital and expertise for the future, but seeking out constructive partnerships to be prepared better for the future and meet the needs of cooperative engagements. We do not need to be in splendid isolation to achieve a world class force, far from it. In an age when most operations use multinational forces we should be building on our relations and seeking out complementarity wherever possible to reduce the strain on our own forces, and maximise the output. That is what is urgently needed in Afghanistan, and I predict it will be similar in our future engagements.

Rather than continuing in the manner we have been, it is time for a new Strategic Defence Review to really reconsider defence and allow us look at what we want to be, what power we want to project, and how we feel we can best be a 'force for good' in the world. The world has moved on since the last review was conducted in 1998 - terrorism, climate change, and the changing nature of conflict have changed the international landscape - and if we are not careful we risk getting left behind. Though there will always be a cost involved in defence, it is now time we start assessing the value.