Nick Harvey MP

REBUILDING A CONSENSUS OVER THE UK'S DEFENCE POLICY

When rebuilding a consensus where do we start?

Indeed, was there ever a consensus over Britain's defence policy? And is it possible?

I would like to say yes, but that is dependent on everyone agreeing on my point of view.

However, as you who engage with politics and politicians on a regular basis can testify, consensus is usually an alien concept in the corridors of Westminster, and in the departments of Whitehall.

A rarity that is often lauded and seldom achieved.

The British political system and culture is antagonistic. Wholesale change would be welcome but until it comes, the checks and balances of the current set-up demand robust argument.

If attainable, and this is a big IF, consensus in defence policy could bring continuity, coherence and clarity to our national defence strategy, but differences over tactics would remain - very healthy!

It would help guard against dramatic shifts in British policy objectives with a change of government,

Provide a common thread around which key decisions could be made .

Perhaps, above all, it could ensure that the needs and welfare of our service personnel remain paramount.

For consensus to truly benefit our defence policy, it is needed at four levels:

With the armed forces

Between political parties,

With our international allies abroad,

And at home, among the British public.

It is these levels which I intend to examine.

Consensus with the armed forces

We hardly need reminding that our armed forces have been taken to a point of critical overstretch.

With simultaneous operations in two hostile theatres, on top of additional commitments, it is the personnel who feel the toll.

Longer and more frequent tours of duty place strain on them and their families,

Poor housing and questions over welfare have left many feeling neglected,

(And we see a rise in mental health casualties, due to climb further over the coming years as a result of recent frontline experiences,)

As those who carry out defence policy, the forces' backing is essential.

Good defence policy without personnel is like a strategically brilliant football game without the players!

The one cannot work without the other, but together, defence policy and personnel, can work better.

A number of high ranking military figures have broken ranks to speak out about the current operations, and their advice should be heeded. Coroners have issued withering verdicts on the MOD.

We need to rebuild trust with the armed forces, and give assurances that we will not send them on future operations unless we can provide the equipment, support and resources they need to complete the objectives successfully.

They should know unequivocally, that the covenant will be upheld, and our side of the bargain met.

And as part of that they should be at the heart of our future planning.

So we take into account our human capabilities and the human cost of future operations.

Building Political Consensus

I believe that if consensus is to be built it must be founded on fundamental strategic pillars which transcend the traditional political divides.

On the floors of the Commons and the Lords we can all agree that we need to honour the military covenant and look after the men and women who serve in our armed forces,

That ensuring our frontline troops have the best equipment and the right kit is an imperative,

And that the Strategic Defence Review of 1998 was a good, if now outdated, approach to the shape of our armed forces.

And these are good platforms upon which to build.

However, as recent political history has shown, 'blanket' consensus would be is difficult to achieve and may as I have hinted not even be desirable.

Changes in the strategic and political landscape mean it is often a fragile concept.

If we did all agree on everything, then Parliament and debate become meaningless, we lose the checks and balances and scrutiny on the Government, and politicians will have become so dishonest we might as well count the silverware!

Nonetheless, it is in engagements and operations - how, where and why our forces are used - that accord is subject to tensions.

Whilst all three parties might be united behind our involvement in Afghanistan, we were not united behind action in Iraq and would probably not be united behind any future strike against Iran.

These are based on political priorities and partisan leanings and are key sticking points when the three parties come together.

(Maybe a reference to today… and the nature of the other comments that have gone before?? Or how actually today you have agreed and this is rare… )

Therefore before any real agreement can be reached, and areas of common ground are developed, it is time for some frank questions, which we can perhaps address in the questions after:

We need to be asking:

What type of defence policy do we want? What role do we want to play on the world stage?

Do we want to be expeditionary? Do we want to only engage in wars of necessity rather than wars of choice? Do we want to be a strong force for good in humanitarian crises?

Depending on the answer to these, we need to assess how we can shape our armed forces to meet those goals.

We should look at our current capabilities and our future procurement projects and ask honestly - do these meet these objectives? Can they meet the hard and soft power projection demands that we are likely to ask of them?

And, how can we do it better?

I feel I have become blue in the face from saying it, but a new Strategic Defence Review will address these questions and help us establish the foundations to move forward.

For too long we have been operating on outdated and unchallenged assumptions.

Whilst tanks were essential to the Cold War, air power is now as crucial - if not more so - to Afghanistan.

We should be asking ourselves, collectively, how can we best meet these changing needs?

And, by consequence, how can we best achieve success - effectively, efficiently and with minimal error.

At present, procurement projects take so long to progress from conception to the frontline that a better, faster, safer model has been designed in the meantime. (think FRES)

Bureaucracy in the MOD means decisions are slow and cumbersome, and unnecessarily delayed, (think aircraft carriers)

and changes in combat techniques or theatres of operation require urgent responses and new methods to ensure our troops remain prepared and protected (again a move away from heavy tanks to helicopters).

The 1998 SDR served to unite us behind the conceptual ideas of national defence policy, if not the practice.

But, in light of the changes on the international landscape - the decline of the bi-polar divide, the rise in international terrorism, and the increasing strain on our forces and the defence budget (to name a few) - we should be reassessing defence again to formulate a framework to which successive Governments can refer.

Building International Consensus

I also believe that it is time to look to our allies.

We are no longer a great power that can afford to go it alone on all fronts - and must kill off the delusion that we can

As a part of NATO, the UN and indeed the EU, and with close alliances to our neighbours and Atlantic partners, our national policy cannot be seen in isolation

We should consider our own policy as part of a wider international picture.

But of course national security and strategic interests remain paramount, and so they should,

Having a clear consensus over our international obligations - most specifically Afghanistan - is now vital to their success.

It is clear that without our allies in Afghanistan, we will lose.

And it would be a costly failure.

However, looking at the state of the current defence budget (figures about ranking) we are in no state to be acting alone on either procurements or operations.

We should try and find areas of commonality on which we can build. And seek to maximise our output, at more moderate expense.

Despite this logic, multilateralism remains a key sticking point.

Although the Liberal Democrats and the Government are keen to engage in dialogue about how we can work with our European partners, most notably France, and embrace our multilateral ties for greater military effect, the Conservatives continue to drag their feet.

We should be clear on this, working with Europe will neither undermine our national sovereignty, nor the special relationship we enjoy, and will continue to enjoy, with America.

With 27 Member States marching to their own tune, we will, undoubtedly, come into difficulty. And it is a difficulty that can be avoided, and should be avoided.

Only recently the American ambassador, Victoria Nuland, declared that it wants a Europe with teeth

"Europe needs, the United States needs, NATO needs, the democratic world needs - a stronger, more capable European defense capacity."

If we play our cards right, and get involved at the outset we can help set the agenda with our partners.

We can develop the lines along which partnership would be beneficial - such as procurements, off the shelf purchases, or sharing of resources, and demarcate the boundaries at which the partnership should end.

I will admit I am totally hostile to the idea of a European army, and would be among the first to vote against one.

However, it does not need to - and never would - go that far.

"There is no such thing as an international soldier."

And based on the inherent difficulties with the EU we should not expect it to happen.

European level is more about coordination than control.

But we should be using it to do more for our Western allies, and prove a greater force on the world stage, if only in credible 'soft' power.

Building Popular Consensus

Whilst we are developing the foreign front, we must not forget the home front.

Domestically, defence has seen a decline in fortunes.

For a country with a proud military heritage, the people are no longer united behind our forces.

And, following mass mobilised opposition to the War in Iraq, our ventures overseas are not widely supported.

Even Afghanistan, seen by all three parties as the 'war of the generation' is low on support among the British public, many of whom understand neither our involvement nor our objectives.

If we are to be in the region for the next twenty, or even thirty, years, we need more support.

And engaging with the public is essential if we are to avoid getting battle weary before our objectives have been realised.

Helping people understand British defence priorities and obligations does not need to be brought about by jingoistic flag waving and military parades.

However, we do need to be communicating better with the public about what we are doing, why we are doing it and why it is so important, and establish a greater grassroots consensus so our forces feel supported.

We need to be letting people know the role our forces play as part of our national strategy.

In fact, all those questions I mentioned earlier, need to be addressed in the public domain.

The answers need to be conveyed and practical steps taken build domestic consensus for the future.

Problems with building consensus - Conclusions

Despite all this, I feel I am talking more in concept than practice.

There will be inherent problems with building consensus.

As I said before, consensus is not a natural state for either politicians or the general public.

Nor should it be.

Something has gone wrong if we really can agree without question or concern.

Political agendas and changing priorities will always interfere.

Therefore when rebuilding consensus it is about finding a consensus that is flexible enough to respond to change and be bent to the will of different priorities and agendas,

But still remain true to some integral core values and principles.

Based on who we are on the international stage, what role we want to play, and why we want to be that way.

This is how consensus can be constructive.

We need a strategic rather than a practical consensus.

One that addresses the fundamental questions that have too long been waiting to be asked,

And that shapes our capabilities in the current strategic landscape

And can envisage the challenges of the future.

Only then can we determine how best this type of consensus can be delivered.